This volume brings together eminent theologians, philosophers and political theorists to discuss such questions as how religious understandings have shaped the moral landscape of contemporary culture; the possible contributions of theology and theologically informed moral argument to contemporary public life; the problem of religious and moral discourse in a pluralistic society; and the proper relationship between religion and culture.

Dans ce texte inédit, extrait de l’ouvrage qu’il est en train de rédiger, Charles Taylor propose une analyse de la poétique romantique qui remonte à ses sources dans la Kabbale, la théorie de la signatura rerum et la philosophie de la Renaissance, mais qui en manifeste en même temps l’originalité, en tant que réponse au « désenchantement du monde » propre à la modernité. Il esquisse ainsi une compréhension du langage et de la fonction poétique qui place en (...) son centre sa dimension de révélation ou de dévoilement ( disclosure ), aboutissant à la conclusion que « la philosophie sérieuse ne peut pas se permettre d’ignorer l’intelligence poétique ». (shrink)

La filosofia morale moderna è incapace di affrontare la diversità dei beni perché cerca di risolvere i problemi a essa connessi con una moralità risolutiva, rigidamente gerarchizzata. Ma ogni ritratto adeguato delle nostre vite deve rendere giustizia tanto alla differenza quanto all'unità. A tal scopo, è necessario cominciare a distinguere, perché nel ragionamento morale tutto dipende dai dettagli. E le risorse del ragionamento morale sono maggiori di quanto in genere ritengano i filosofi morali moderni. Trovare una "misura" tra l'aspirazione all'unità (...) e la diversità dei beni è il vero secreto del "condurre una vita".Modern moral philosophy is unable to deal with the diversity of goods because it tries to solve the problems it rises by a top priority, all-trumping morality. But any adequate account of our lives has to do justice to both difference and unity. To attain this goal, we have to begin to make distinctions, because everything hangs on the details in moral reasoning. And the resources of moral reasoning are greater than they are normally supposed to be in today moral philosophy. To find a "measure" between the aspiration to oneness and the diversity of goods is the true secret of our "living a life". (shrink)

First published in 1975, this is a book of general intellectual interest about the role of the university in contemporary society and that of university teachers in relation to their subjects, their students, and their wider political commitments. Alan Montefiore offers preliminary analyses of the family of concepts most often invoked in discussions of these problems, taking the central dispute to be between those who hold a 'liberal' view of the university and those who regard this notion as illusory, dishonest (...) or undesirable. Six academics, representing, discuss issues of substantive conflict in light of Montefiore's initial distinctions. The volume is of particular interest to students of political and social philosophy, and political and educational theory. It is also intended for a wider readership among those who care about the political status of the universities and recognize the importance and difficulty of the problems involved in this. (shrink)

Dans ce livre très original, Markus Gabriel avance une théorie du soi humain qui surmonte les blocages inhérents aux positions standards en philosophie de l’esprit contemporaine. Son point de vue, le néo-existentialisme, est intégralement antinaturaliste, en ce sens qu’il rejette toute théorie selon laquelle l’ensemble de nos meilleures connaissances scientifiques naturelles serait pleinement capable de rendre compte de l’esprit humain. L’auteur montre plutôt que l’esprit humain consiste en une prolifération ouverte de vocabulaires mentalistes. Leur rôle dans la forme de vie (...) humaine consiste à rendre compte du fait que l’être humain ne se fond pas simplement dans la nature inanimée et le reste du règne animal. Les humains s’appuient sur un autoportrait qui les situe dans un contexte aussi large que possible au sein de l’univers. Ce qui distingue cet autoportrait de notre connaissance de la réalité naturelle, c’est que nous changeons en vertu de nos croyances, vraies ou fausses, au sujet de nous-mêmes. (shrink)

This paper provides a brief overview and critique of the dominant objectivist understanding and use of illness narrative in Enlightenment (scientific) medicine and ethics, as well as several revisionist accounts, which reflect the evolution of this approach. In light of certain limitations and difficulties endemic in the objectivist understanding of illness narrative, an alternative phronesis approach to medical ethics influenced by Charles Taylor’s account of the interpretive nature of human agency and language is examined. To this end, the (...) account of interpretive medical responsibility previously described by Schultz and Carnevale as "clinical phronesis" (based upon Taylor’s notion of "strong" or "radical evaluation") is reviewed and expanded. The thesis of this paper is that illness narrative has the ability to benefit patients as well as the potential to cause harm or iatrogenic effects. This benefit or harm is contingent upon how the story is told and understood. Consequently, these tales are not simply "nice stories," cathartic gestures, or mere supplements to scientific procedures and decision making, as suggested by the objectivist approach. Rather, they open the agent to meanings that provide a context for explanation and evaluation of illness episodes and therapeutic activities. This understanding provides indicators (guides) for right action. Hence, medical responsibility as clinical phronesis involves, first, the patient and provider’s coformulation and cointerpretation of what is going on in the patient’s illness narrative, and second, the patient and provider’s response to interpretation of the facts of illness and what they signify–not simply a response to the brute facts of illness, alone. The appeal to medical responsibility as clinical phronesis thus underscores the importance of getting the patient’s story of illness right. It is anticipated that further elaboration concerning the idea of clinical phronesis as interpretive illness narrative will provide a new foundation for medical ethics and decision making. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s ideal supports a radical form of “deep diversity,” to use Charles Taylor’s expression. It is radical because it embraces not only irreducible conceptions of the good but also incompatible ones. This is due to its paradoxical nature, which arises from its affirmation of both monism and pluralism, the One and the Many, together. It does so in at least three ways. First, in terms of the structure of the self, Kierkegaard describes his ideal as both unified (the (...) “positive third”) and plural (a “negative unity”). Second, he affirms a process which brings together unity, as implied by the linear notion of “stages”, with plurality, in the form of “spheres of existence” (aesthetic, ethical, and religious). And third, the culmination of the process implies that we should embrace both a unified dialectic (“Religiousness A”) alongside the plural remnants of the ethical/aesthetic, that is, both the infinity of the former and the finitudes of the latter. Unsurprisingly, while Kierkegaard describes those who are able to exemplify his ideal in practice as “always joyful,” he also considers the ideal to be “extremely hard, the hardest task of all.” This is why those such as Hubert L. Dreyfus are wrong to claim that it provides an experience of bliss; on the contrary, those who realize it “are always in danger.” As I shall show, one form this danger takes is that it threatens to dirty the hands of those who manage to uphold Kierkegaard’s ideal. Moreover, it does so in ways that, I claim, tend to be missed by Kierkegaard himself. Nevertheless, the danger is also essential to the creativity of his approach, and I conclude by pointing out how this creativity makes it capable of tackling one of the profoundest challenges in contemporary ethics: that arising from what just war theorists call a “supreme emergency.” . (shrink)

I argue that the criticisms made by d. h. mellor in 'mind', january, 1968, of two arguments central to charles taylor's thesis concerning teleological explanation in 'the explanation of behaviour' can readily be accommodated by taylor. in neither case is the argument used to make the distinction that mellor alleges.

This article tries to point out a source of potential conflict in Charles Taylor’s theoretical perspective. There is an unsolved tension between the historical reconstruction of the genealogy of the modern identity and the theoretical claim that our moral reactions are the basis of an objective assessment of practices. My intention is to analyse this tension at three different levels of discourse: first, Taylor’s position as a liberal non-atomist thinker hinges upon his idea that our moral identity (...) depends on our free determination of our relation to good, which can be pursued only within the experience of a community. Second, this Hegelian trait of his perspective is also present in his meta-ethical theory, in which our moral reactions are said to be both instinctive and culturally mediate. In this case, it is not clear how an individual or a group can transcend this limited perspective, if any appeal to reason is inextricably tied to historical delimitations. Third, the principle that any culture in itself is to be considered equally valuable appears to be disputable in front of the objection that some cultures do violate what seem to be fundamental rights and therefore do not deserve equal consideration and are not to be preserved. (shrink)

Le philosophe canadien Charles Taylor est un des penseurs contemporains qui jouit d’une reconnaissance mondiale : il a initié et participé à plusieurs débats relatifs au libéralisme, au communautarisme et au multiculturalisme. Son œuvre est pluridimensionnelle puisque ses travaux portant, entre autres, sur la théorie de science, la théorie du langage, la théorie de l’action et de la personne, la théorie de la modernité.La pensée de Charles Taylor s’est élaborée non seulement en se nourrissant des traditions (...) aussi bien phénoménologique qu’analytique, mais, très concrètement, en prise directe avec les problèmes soulevés dans la société canadienne par la très grande diversité des immigrations. Sa pensée mérite d’autant plus à être méditée que les tentations de repli communautaire, si ce n’est de purification ethnique, semblent aujourd’hui croissantes. Les contributions – pour moitié en anglais – de ce colloque organisé à Budapest en 2012 en l’honneur et en présence de Charles Taylor invitent au contraire à interroger et à poursuivre son analyse des conditions qui permettraient l’avènement d’un monde véritablement pluriel. (shrink)

This work proposes a philosophical analysis of the ideal of authenticity, first by presenting and discussing the works of Charles Taylor and Charles Larmore, then by developing some more personal analysis of conformism and what the author calls experiences of authenticity.

Dans cet article, j’aborde la question de la notion d’ontologie chez Charles Taylor. Je constate, dans un premier temps, l’abandon par Taylor du point de vue anthropocentrique, ainsi que l’adoption d’une perspective non-anthropocentrique. Je remets ensuite en question l’interprétation de Stephen White, en insistant sur le fait qu’elle ne parvient pas à mettre en valeur l’inspiration métaphysique de la pensée de Taylor. J’estime, en conclusion, que Taylor s’appuie fondamentalement sur un mode d’argumentation métaphysique qui est (...) sous-estimé lorsqu’on le présente comme un «ontologiste “faible”». (shrink)

Ce livre propose d'aborder la pensée de Charles Taylor par ce qu'il reconnaît être son centre de cohérence : "l'horizon moral de signification". D'entrée de jeu, il situe assez clairement Taylor dans le vaste horizon de la philosophie morale contemporaine. Le texte pose bien l'originalité de la conception taylorienne de l'ontologie ; ses idées d'incarnations, d'engagement et la relation incontournable du moi. Sans complaisance, il montre le rôle central que joue cet horizon dans la philosophie morale taylorienne (...) tout en exposant les zones d'ombre où Taylor est moins clair ou moins explicite dans sa pensée. En illustrant clairement le lien entre l'horizon moral et l'identité d'une part, et celui entre les horizons et le dialogue interculturel d'autre part, le livre enrichit les analyses existantes sur le sujet. Il expose le dilemme taylorien entre contexte et universalisme. L'originalité de Taylor réside dans la manière dont il repose ce dilemme conservant en tension ces deux axes; orienter sa vie en fonction du bien nous oblige à naviguer entre deux eaux. La question du dialogue interculturel est naturellement incontournable dans le présent débat avec Taylor. Les considérations sur le "langage des contrastes" et le passage par les écrits de Raoul Fornet-Betancourt sont tout à fait pertinents. En effet, l'interculturalité ou le dialogue interculturel appelle un nouveau langage, mais les conditions de celui-ci? et son statut ontologique d'ailleurs ne sont pas clairement exprimées dans les écrits tayloriens. Et ils peuvent difficilement l'être, car cela demeure pour lui de l'ordre du mystère et du dévoilement. L'ouverture à l'autre et à l'altérité est un chemin qui mène à plusieurs inconnus et appelle ce que Taylor nomme une transformation."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Introduction [Nancy L. Rosenblum] I. Varieties of Liberalism Today 1. The Liberalism of Fear [Judith N. Shklar] 2. Humanist Liberalism [Susan Moller Okin] 3. Liberal Democracy and the Costs of Consent [Benjamin R. Barber] II. Education and the Moral Life 4. Undemocratic Education [Amy Gutmann] 5. Civic Education in the Liberal State [William Galston] III. Moral Conflict 6. Class Conflict and Constitutionalism in J. S. Mill’s Thought [Richard Ashcraft] 7. Making Sense of Moral Conflict [Steven Lukes] 8. Liberal Dialogue Versus (...) a Critical Theory of Discursive Legitimation [Seyla Benhabib] IV. Repairing Individualist and Communitarian Failings 9. Cross-Purposes: The Liberal--Communitarian Debate [Charles Taylor] 10. Democratic Individuality and the Meaning of Rights [George Kateb] 11. Pluralism and Self-Defense [Nancy L. Rosenblum] 12. The Permanent Structure of Antiliberal Thought [Stephen Holmes]. (shrink)

In Discovering Levinas, Michael L. Morgan shows how this thinker faces in novel and provocative ways central philosophical problems of twentieth-century philosophy and religious thought. He tackles this task by placing Levinas in conversation with philosophers such as Donald Davidson, Stanley Cavell, John McDowell, Onora O'Neill, Charles Taylor, and Cora Diamond. He also seeks to understand Levinas within philosophical, religious, and political developments in the history of twentieth-century intellectual culture. Morgan demystifies Levinas by examining his unfamiliar and surprising (...) vocabulary, interpreting texts with an eye to clarity, and arguing that Levinas can be understood as a philosopher of the everyday. Morgan also shows that Levinas's ethics is not morally and politically irrelevant nor is it excessively narrow and demanding in unacceptable ways. Neither glib dismissal nor fawning acceptance, this book provides a sympathetic reading that can form a foundation for a responsible critique. (shrink)

Multiculturalist theories of recognition consist of explanatory-descriptive social theoretical accounts of the position of the minorities whose predicaments the theories seek to address, together with normative principles generating political implications. Although theories of recognition are often based on illiberal principles or couched in illiberal-sounding language, it is possible to combine proper liberal principles with the kind of social theoretical accounts of minority groups highlighted in multiculturalism. The importance of ‘the social bases of self-respect’ in Rawls’s political liberalism is used to (...) illustrate how a liberal theory of recognition might be constructed, and it is argued that such a theory can capture some, though not all, of the concerns of multiculturalism, even though the resulting ‘politics of recognition’ is neither a ‘politics of difference’ nor a kind of ‘identity politics’. (shrink)

Guillaume St-Laurent | : Le projet philosophique central de Charles Taylor se présente comme une critique de l’« image épistémologique » (epistemological picture) de la raison, critique qui se déploie au nom d’une compréhension de la rationalité humaine plus sensible à sa finitude transcendantale et historique. L’objectif du présent essai consiste à présenter une brève analyse comparative de cette image épistémologique (ou post-cartésienne) ainsi que de la perspective herméneutique que lui oppose notre auteur. En ce sens, nous comparerons (...) tour à tour six aspects déterminants de ces deux conceptions : le caractère « apodictique », « médiationnel », « désengagé », « désignatif », « dépassionné » et « procédural » de la première et le caractère « ad hominem », « immergé », « situé », « expressif », « passionné » et « substantiel » de la seconde. Nous éclairerons en outre les enjeux complexes de cette critique par quelques remarques introductives et conclusives. | : Charles Taylor’s main philosophical project presents itself as a critique of the “epistemological picture” of rationality. This critique is put forward in the name of a new understanding of reason, more sensitive to its transcendental and historical finitude. We herein propose a short comparative analysis of this epistemological (or post-cartesian) picture and Taylor’s hermeneutical perspective. To this effect, we will compare six essential aspects of these two conceptions : the “apodictic”, “mediational”, “disengaged”, “designative”, “dispassionate”, and “procedural” character of the former, and the “ad hominem”, “immerged”, “situated”, “expressive”, “passionate”, and “substantial” character of the latter. We will also try to shed light on these complex issues by some introductive and conclusive remarks. (shrink)

Notre objectif est de montrer que la théorie de l’argumentation philosophique développée par Charles Taylor apporte une solution élégante, quoiqu’implicite, au problème de l’« historicisme transcendantal » dans la tradition herméneutique contemporaine (Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur). Ce problème consiste à se demander comment il peut être possible à la fois (1) de désavouer l’existence de vérités « absolues » ou « anhistoriques » et (2) de reconnaître au discours philosophique sur l’« historicité » (Geschichtlichkeit) de la pensée tous ses (...) droits, puisque ce discours demeure de facto et de jure une pensée de l’a priori. En ce sens, mes analyses se concentre-ront sur la façon dont Taylor parvient à justifier la thèse – en apparence contradictoire – selon laquelle la réflexion philosophique peut parvenir à des conclusions « apodictiques et pourtant ouvertes à un débat sans fin ». Our aim is to show that Charles Taylor’s theory of philosophical argumentation proposes an elegant, albeit implicit, solution to the problem of “transcendental historicism” in contemporary hermeneutics (Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur). This problem consists in asking how it is possible both to (1) disavow the existence of “absolute” or “anhistorical” truths and (2) fully acknowledge the status of philosophical discourses on “historicity” (Geschichtlichkeit), since those discourses remain de facto and de jure properly a priori. The following discussion focusses on how Taylor manages to justify the seemingly contradictory thesis that philosophical reflection can reach conclusions that are “apodictic and yet open to end-less debate.”. (shrink)

Avec L'Age séculier (2007), Charles Taylor couronnait une oeuvre consacrée à la genèse de la modernité et à la pensée du multiple. Il reconstituait la diversité des moments et des réflexions qui menèrent à un âge séculier, aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Mais loin de constituer une synthèse humaniste, laissant derrière lui l'âge théologique, celui-ci éclate à son tour aux XIXe et XXe siècles, par un "effet super-nova" comme Taylor l'a joliment appelé, en une multitude de galaxies (...) nouvelles, où les athéismes côtoient des humanismes déistes mais aussi des "retours de Dieu" surprenants d'expressivité. Ce sont les diverses facettes remarquables de cet 1ge séculier que traitent les auteurs de ce livre : sa place dans l'oeuvre de Taylor, sa théorie complexe de la sécularisation, certains de ses moments historiques, son intérêt - ou non - dans l'actualité des religions. Une confrontation à un maître ouvrage, qui contribue à forger des instruments de pensée permettant de dépasser le conflit entre laïcité intransigeante et "accommodements raisonnables". (shrink)

Oppenheim is, so to speak an unreconstructed reconstructionist, maintaining the ideal of a relatively perspicuous, non-normative social scientific language-"neither wholly reportative nor merely stipulative, but explicative" --against the tide of contemporary criticisms of "positivism" in this domain. While denying that he himself is a positivist in the sense employed by the critics, he defends a number of the ideas that have often been associated with that term in the philosophy of the social sciences, in particular that of the separability of (...) facts from values. In doing so, he exhibits a clear awareness of the claims of many of his opponents--such writers as Alisdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Peter Winch. (shrink)

The philosophical past, once a thing of the past, is with us again. I examine three recent positions about how to understand the philosophical past: the presentism of Richard Rorty, the traditionalism of Alasdair MacIntyre, and the interpretism of Charles Taylor. Rorty, MacIntyre, and Taylor all acknowledge a Hegelian influence upon their views; thus, I also explore Hegel's own view of the history of philosophy. Finally, I offer my own view that our relation to the past ought (...) to be guided by "recognizing" it. Although the concept of recognition is found in Hegel, I argue that Hegel as well as Rorty and MacIntyre end up conceiving of our relation to the past as one of appropriation. Recognition as I define it eschews such appropriation; rather, it consists in a "working through" of the past in a sense the paper specifies. (shrink)

Recent discussions of the nature of mind, emotion, and self have often intersected with renewed interest in the sources of morals and morality. In this article I examine proposals on these matters by Charles Taylor and two of his interlocutors, Thomas Wren and Justin Oakley. I describe and compare the “holistic” epistemological approaches of these three in their searches for the “moral self,” and then evaluate the adequacy of their correlative ontological proposals. Finally, I discuss the meta-ethical implications (...) of these emotive views of selfhood in terms of the objective or subjective status of moral values to determine whether these views meet the philosophers' own criteria for moral plausibility. (shrink)

Cette contribution tentera de cerner les enjeux de l’interprétation contrastée de la philosophie des Lumières proposée par Charles Taylor. Pourquoi le déisme et le matérialisme sont-ils perçus par Taylor comme des fourvoiements de la modernité? Pourquoi considère-t-il que les Lumières ont méconnu la manière dont la subjectivité pouvait fonder ses aspirations morales et politiques? Nous verrons que la philosophie des Lumières « radicales », selon Taylor, produit une morale et une politique incohérentes : elle postule que (...) l’harmonie sociale procède de l’intérêt bien compris grâce à une ingénierie législative et éducative ; mais elle n’explique pas pourquoi l’idéal d’une société harmonieuse mérite d’être poursuivi. L’auteur des Sources du moi entérine de la sorte l’idée répandue d’une incohérence des philosophes matérialistes : leur psychologie hédoniste et égoïste est incompatible avec leur éthique, qui vise le plus grand bonheur du plus grand nombre. Les Lumières sont donc rendues responsables d’une vision contradictoire de la morale et d’une vision appauvrie de la subjectivité. (shrink)